Key Takeaways

1. Employment Division v. Smith (1990) established that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment does not exempt individuals from neutral, generally applicable laws—even if those laws incidentally burden religious practices.
2. The decision sparked significant controversy and led to the passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, which sought to restore stricter scrutiny for laws affecting religious exercise.
3. Smith remains a foundational case in understanding the limits of religious liberty in the United States, particularly in balancing individual rights with state authority and public policy concerns.

Introduction

Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith is among the most influential Supreme Court cases interpreting the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. Decided in 1990, the ruling clarified the extent to which religious beliefs and practices are protected from generally applicable state laws. The case involved two Native American men, Alfred Smith and Galen Black, who were denied unemployment benefits after being fired for using peyote—a controlled substance—as part of a religious ceremony. Their claim that this denial violated their right to free exercise of religion led to a landmark Supreme Court decision, reshaping the legal landscape of religious freedom in the United States.

This guide provides a comprehensive overview of the case, its background, legal reasoning, aftermath, and ongoing significance. For attorneys and legal researchers seeking deeper insights, Counsel Stack offers advanced legal research tools and resources.

Background of the Case

The Facts

Alfred Smith and Galen Black were employed as counselors at a private drug rehabilitation clinic in Oregon. Both men were members of the Native American Church, which uses peyote in certain religious ceremonies. In 1984, Smith and Black were terminated from their positions after it was discovered they had ingested peyote during a religious service. Oregon law classified peyote as a controlled substance, and its use was prohibited except in certain circumstances. After their dismissal, Smith and Black applied for unemployment benefits through the state’s Employment Division.

The Employment Division denied their claims, stating that they were ineligible for benefits because they had been discharged for work-related "misconduct"—specifically, violating the state’s drug laws. Smith and Black challenged this determination, arguing that the denial of benefits infringed upon their First Amendment right to freely exercise their religion.

Procedural History

The case’s journey through the courts was complex:

• Oregon Supreme Court: The Oregon Supreme Court ruled in favor of Smith and Black, holding that the denial of unemployment benefits violated their free exercise rights. The court reasoned that the state must demonstrate a compelling interest to justify such a burden on religious practice.
• U.S. Supreme Court (First Review): The Supreme Court initially vacated the Oregon Supreme Court’s judgment and remanded the case, asking whether Oregon law actually prohibited the religious use of peyote.
• Oregon Supreme Court (On Remand): On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court clarified that state law did indeed prohibit peyote use, even in religious contexts, and reaffirmed its original decision.
• U.S. Supreme Court (Final Decision): The Supreme Court then granted certiorari again and ultimately reversed the Oregon Supreme Court, holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not require exceptions to neutral, generally applicable laws.

For a detailed procedural timeline, see Oyez’s case summary.

The Legal Issues

The Free Exercise Clause

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…”

The central question in Smith was whether the government must accommodate religious practices that conflict with neutral laws of general applicability. Specifically, does the Free Exercise Clause require the state to exempt religiously motivated conduct from generally applicable criminal prohibitions?

Prior Precedents

Before Smith, the Supreme Court had developed a jurisprudence that sometimes required the government to justify burdens on religious exercise by demonstrating a “compelling governmental interest” and that the law was the “least restrictive means” of achieving that interest. This standard, known as strict scrutiny, was applied in cases such as:

• Sherbert v. Verner (1963): The Court held that denying unemployment benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist who refused to work on her Sabbath violated the Free Exercise Clause.
• Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972): The Court ruled that Amish children could not be forced to attend school past eighth grade, as it conflicted with their religious beliefs.

These cases suggested that religiously motivated conduct was sometimes entitled to exemptions from generally applicable laws.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

Majority Opinion

Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy. The Court held that:

“The right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).”

The Court reasoned that if every individual could claim an exemption from laws based on religious grounds, it would undermine the rule of law and make each person “a law unto himself.” The majority distinguished between laws that specifically target religious practices (which would be unconstitutional) and those that are neutral and generally applicable (which are permissible even if they incidentally burden religion).

For the full text of the opinion, see the Cornell Law School’s Legal Information Institute.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment but wrote separately, arguing that the Court should have applied the compelling interest test and found that Oregon’s interest in prohibiting peyote use was not sufficiently compelling to override religious freedom. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissented, emphasizing the importance of robust constitutional protection for religious exercise.

The Rationale Behind the Ruling

Neutral Laws of General Applicability

The key principle established in Smith is that the Free Exercise Clause does not require exemptions from “neutral laws of general applicability.” In other words, if a law is not aimed at suppressing religion and applies equally to everyone, it does not violate the Free Exercise Clause—even if it incidentally burdens religious practice.

The Court emphasized the dangers of granting religious exemptions too freely, warning that such a system would create a patchwork of exceptions and erode the authority of the law.

Distinguishing Previous Cases

The Court distinguished Smith from earlier cases like Sherbert and Yoder, noting that those cases involved individualized assessments or targeted laws, rather than generally applicable criminal prohibitions. In Smith, the law banning peyote was not directed at religious practices but was a general prohibition on a controlled substance.

The “Compelling Interest Test” Reconsidered

While previous cases had applied strict scrutiny to laws burdening religious exercise, the Court in Smith limited that approach to situations where the law is not neutral or generally applicable, or where the government makes individualized exceptions. This marked a significant shift in Free Exercise jurisprudence.

Aftermath and Legislative Response

Public and Political Reaction

The Smith decision was highly controversial. Many religious groups, civil liberties organizations, and legal scholars criticized the ruling for weakening protections for religious exercise. They argued that the decision allowed the government to burden religious practices without adequate justification.

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)

In response to Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993. RFRA sought to restore the compelling interest test for cases where government action substantially burdens religious exercise. Under RFRA, the government must show that any such burden is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.

RFRA applies to federal laws and actions, but the Supreme Court later held in City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) that Congress lacked authority to impose RFRA’s requirements on state and local governments. Many states, including Oregon, subsequently passed their own versions of RFRA or similar statutes.

For more on RFRA, see the U.S. Department of Justice’s overview.

Continuing Debate and Legal Developments

Smith remains a flashpoint in debates over religious liberty and the proper balance between individual rights and government authority. The ruling has been cited in numerous subsequent cases, both to uphold and to challenge the limits of the Free Exercise Clause.

Some legal scholars and advocates continue to call for Smith to be overturned or limited, arguing that it fails to provide adequate protection for minority religions and unconventional practices. Others defend the decision as necessary to preserve the rule of law and prevent abuse of religious exemptions.

Broader Implications

Impact on Religious Freedom

Smith fundamentally altered the constitutional landscape for religious freedom claims. By narrowing the circumstances in which religious exemptions are constitutionally required, the decision made it more difficult for individuals and groups to challenge generally applicable laws on religious grounds.

This has had particular significance for minority religions and practices that are less likely to be accommodated by legislatures or administrative agencies.

State Laws and Religious Exemptions

In the wake of Smith, many states have enacted their own protections for religious exercise, either through legislation or constitutional amendments. These state-level laws can provide greater protection than the federal Constitution, but their scope and application vary widely.

For example, see the ACLU of Oregon’s summary of state religious freedom protections.

Ongoing Legal and Social Questions

Smith continues to influence debates over issues such as:

• Religious objections to public health mandates (e.g., vaccination requirements)
• Religious exemptions from anti-discrimination laws
• The rights of religious minorities in the criminal justice system

The case also raises questions about the appropriate role of courts versus legislatures in protecting religious liberty.

For a discussion of these debates, see the Pew Research Center’s analysis.

Case Analysis and Scholarly Perspectives

Criticisms of the Smith Decision

Critics argue that Smith undermines the core purpose of the Free Exercise Clause by allowing the government to burden religious practices without sufficient justification. They contend that minority religions, in particular, may lack the political influence to secure legislative exemptions and thus are vulnerable to majoritarian laws that inadvertently restrict their practices.

Some legal scholars believe that the Court’s reasoning in Smith is inconsistent with the broader commitment to religious pluralism and tolerance that underpins the First Amendment.

Defenses of Smith

Supporters of the decision argue that requiring exemptions for religious practices from every generally applicable law would create chaos and undermine the rule of law. They maintain that democratic processes, rather than the courts, are better suited to balancing religious liberty with other public interests.

The majority opinion in Smith reflects a concern that too many judicially mandated exemptions would result in a fragmented legal system and weaken the authority of the state to enforce laws for the common good.

Influence on Later Cases

Smith has been cited in a range of subsequent Supreme Court cases dealing with the Free Exercise Clause and religious accommodation, including:

• Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah (1993): The Court struck down city ordinances targeting Santeria animal sacrifice, distinguishing Smith by finding the laws were not neutral or generally applicable.
• Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (2014): The Court applied RFRA to exempt closely held corporations from providing contraceptive coverage, showing the continuing importance of legislative protections for religious exercise.

For summaries of these and related cases, see the National Constitution Center’s library.

Practical Implications for Attorneys and Advocates

Navigating the Post-Smith Legal Landscape

Attorneys representing clients with religious freedom claims must be aware that constitutional challenges under the Free Exercise Clause face significant hurdles when the law at issue is neutral and generally applicable. However, statutory protections like RFRA (at the federal level) or state equivalents may provide alternative avenues for relief.

Importance of Legislative Advocacy

Given the limits of the Free Exercise Clause post-Smith, legislative advocacy has become a crucial strategy for securing religious exemptions and protections. Many successful religious liberty claims now depend on the existence of statutory safeguards rather than direct constitutional arguments.

Research Tools and Resources

For attorneys and legal researchers seeking to stay current on developments in religious freedom law, Counsel Stack offers a robust platform for legal research, case law, and analysis. Official sources for Smith and related cases include:

• Oyez: Employment Division v. Smith
• Justia: Supreme Court Opinion
• Cornell LII: Full Text
• Federalist Society: Case Overview
• Ballotpedia: Case Summary
• Teaching American History: Educational Resource

Conclusion

Employment Division v. Smith stands as a pivotal Supreme Court decision interpreting the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. By holding that neutral, generally applicable laws do not require religious exemptions under the Constitution, the Court fundamentally reshaped the legal framework for religious liberty in America. The decision’s legacy includes not only ongoing legal debate but also significant legislative responses, most notably the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Understanding Smith is essential for anyone grappling with the complex interplay between individual rights, state authority, and the evolving landscape of religious freedom.

Attorneys and legal professionals should consult Counsel Stack for in-depth legal research and analysis on Smith and related cases.

Disclaimer: This guide is for informational purposes only and provides a general overview of Employment Division v. Smith. The case and its implications involve complex legal issues and nuances. For specific legal advice or analysis, consult a qualified attorney or legal professional.